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FEDERALISM, HYDROELECTRIC LICENSING
AND THE FUTURE OF MINIMUM
STREAMFLOWS AFTER CALIFORNIA v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION
By
MICHAEL C. BLUMM*

Licensing of hydroelectric projects by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the Federal Power Act (FPA) materially affects streamflows on rivers throughout the nation. Often
overlooked, FERC licensing will gain prominence in the next decade as hundreds of projects must be relicensed. Although the FPA
instructs FERC to balance economic and environmental issues, in
practice FERC has been notoriously insensitive to fish and wildlife protection, favoring maximization of hydropower revenues.
Professor Blumm evaluates the Supreme Court's recent decision
in California v. FERC, which held that FERC may preempt state
minimum streamflows higher than those set by FERC. Although
he notes that the decision does not enable FERC to override flows
set by other federal agencies, Blumm predicts that the result will
exacerbate FERC's traditional bias against streamflows necessary
to protect fish and wildlife. He concludes that while states are not
powerless to affect minimum flows at hydroelectric projects, the
objective of reaching a fair balance between economic and environmental values will require an amendment to the FPA reversing
California v. FERC.
Hydroelectric licensing under the Federal Power Act (FPA)1
is not generally considered a central component of environmental
law. True, the first modern environmental law case involved hydroelectric licensing,2 and the U.S. Supreme Court declared that
* Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College.
My thanks to Lorraine Bodi for her comments on a draft of this Essay, to John
Thomas for editorial assistance, and to the Lewis and Clark Summer Research
Program for support.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1988).
2. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (remanding the Storm King pump
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alternatives analysis was central to reasoned hydroelectric decision making over two years before Congress made consideration
of alternatives a central feature of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).3 Yet virtually every environmental law text
ignores hydroelectric licensing under the FPA.4 Neither the Environmental Law Handbook nor the leading treatises devote any attention to the subject.'
The relegation of the FPA to the backwaters of environmental law is unfortunate because there are large environmental
stakes in hydroelectric licensing. During the 1990s, more than two
hundred projects must be relicensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).e Most of these were licensed fifty
years ago, long before reserving streamflows for fish and wildlife
or water quality protection became commonplace. Both Congress
and the courts have decreed that in relicensing proceedings
storage project on the Hudson River to the Federal Power Commission (FPC) for
failure to consider environmental factors in the licensing process). See generally
A.

TALBOT, POWER ALONG THE HUDsON: THE STORM KING CASE AND THE BIRTH OF

ENVIRONMENTALISM

(1972); Comment, Calm After the Storm: Grandmother of En-

vironmental Lawsuits Settled by Mediation, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,074 (1981).
3. Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967) (remanding the High
Mountain Sheep Dam to the FPC for failure to consider the alternatives of federal
development and no development at all). Cf. National Environmental Policy Act
§§ 102(2)(C)(iii), 102(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(iii), 102(2)(E) (requiring all
federal agencies to evaluate alternative courses of action); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14
(1989) (Council on Environmental Quality regulations implementing NEPA, referring to alternatives analysis as the heart of NEPA).
4. See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2d ed. 1990); J. BATTLE & M. SQUILLACE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (3 vols.
1986-88); R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 1985); T.
SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW (1985 ed.); F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (3d ed. 1985); J. BONINE & T. McGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

(1984); R.

STEWART &

J.

KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

(2d ed.

1978). Some of the Energy and Water Law texts do contain some coverage. See,
e.g., W. RODGERS, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 379-90 (2d ed. 1983); C.
MEYERS, A. TARLOCK, J. COREBRIDGE & D. GETCHES, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 895-921 (3d ed. 1988).
5. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES, INC., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK (10th ed.
1989). See, e.g., W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR, WATER, PESTICIDES &
TOXIC SUBSTANCES (3 vols. 1986-88); F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (4
vols. 1988-89); F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

(1981).
6. FERC estimates that 238 projects will require relicensing in the 1990s; 155
licenses expire on one day alone, December 31, 1993. See 52 Fed. Reg. 4648 (1987).
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FERC must reconsider project operations according to today's
values and regulatory requirements. 7 There is thus the prospect
of a substantial restructuring of streamflows on rivers throughout
the nation.
Regrettably, over the years, FERC has proved to be insensitive to the need to maintain streamflows for environmental purposes.' As a result, Congress long ago removed from FERC the
authority to set flows for water quality purposes.? But, fish and
wildlife flows remain within the Commission's jurisdiction, although federal and state fish and wildlife agencies have important
statutory roles to play in FERC licensing.'0 Whether fish and
wildlife agencies have the authority to set conditions that hydroelectric projects must, meet-especially fish flows-has been
controversial.
Not surprisingly, FERC has consistently adopted a broad
view of its authority and a narrow view of that of fishery agencies.
That view has induced a number of judicial reversals, however.
For example, FERC cannot (1) relicense projects while deferring
fish protection measures," (2) exempt projects from licensing
7. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 22 (1986), reprintedin 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2537, 2538 (Conference Committee report on the
Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986) ("Projects licensed years earlier must
undergo the scrutiny of today's values ....");Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Reservation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d
466, 470-71, 476 (9th Cir. 1984) (a relicensing is functionally equivalent to an initial licensing).
8. See, e.g., Bodi & Erdheim, Swimming Upstream: FERC's Failure to Protect Anadromous Fish, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 7 (1986). FERC's environmental sensitivity is reflected in the fact that the agency did not promulgate regulations implementing NEPA until 19871 17 years late. See 52 Fed. Reg. 47,910 (1987)
(implementing regulations now codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 380 (1990)).
9. Since 1972, § 401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988), has
authorized states to insert conditions necessary to meet water quality standards in
all federal permits and licenses, including FERC licenses.
10. For a good overview of how to participate in FERC decision making, see
J. ECHEVERRIA, P, BARROW & R. Roos COLLINS, RIVERS AT RISK: THE CONCERNED
CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO HYDROPOWER (1989).
11. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466, 470-73 (9th Cir. 1984), discussed in Blumm, A
Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Reforming the Federal Role in Hydropower Licensing,
10 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 34-46 (1986). See also Bodi, FERC's Mid-Columbia
Proceeding: Ten Years and Still Counting, 16 ENVTL. L. 555 (1986).
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where the project involves new construction,12 or (3) issue preliminary permits for a number of projects in a single river basin
without establishing a mechanism to e'valuate their cumulative
impacts.1 3 Moreover, FERC has to satisfy NEPA procedures in
relicensing projects 4 and issuing exemptions. 5 The Commission
must also include operating conditions set by federal land managers for projects located on federal reservations. 6
Despite the important limits these cases impose on FERC's
licensing authority, and despite others imposed by Congress,"
FERC has always maintained that it may license projects over the
objections of states, relying on forty-year old Supreme Court precedent.' That position was challenged by the State of California,
but on May 21, 1990, a unanimous Supreme Court in California
v. FERC rejected the state's challenge and affirmed FERC.' This
Essay and the preceding one by Roderick Walston, 0 who litigated
12. The Steamboaters v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 759 F.2d 1382
(9th Cir. 1985), discussed in Blumm & Kloos, Small Scale Hydropower and
Anadromous Fish: Lessons and Questions from the Winchester Dam Controversy, 16 ENVTL. L. 583 (1986).
13. NationalWildlife Fed'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 801 F.2d
1505, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1986), discussed in Feldman, National Wildlife Federation
v. FERC and Washington State Department of Fisheries v. FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Ignores Ninth Circuit Rebuke of Hydropower Permitting, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 319 (1988). See also La Flamme v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1988) (NEPA requires cumulative impact
analysis prior to licensing).
14. Confederated. Tribes, 746 F.2d at 475-77.
15. Tulalip Tribes v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 732 F.2d 1451,
1454 (9th Cir. 1984), discussed in Blumm, supra note 11, at 6-20.
16. Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466
U.S. 765 (1984), discussed in Blumm, supra note 11, at 20-34.
17. Section 18 of the FPA requires FERC to include in its licenses "such
fishways as may be prescribed" by the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior.
16 U.S.C. § 811 (1988). See infra note 91 and accompanying text. Section 30(c) of
the FPA gives federal and state fish and wildlife agencies mandatory conditioning
authority over projects exempted from licensing. Id. § 823a. FERC may not license projects "on or directly affecting" federal wild and scenic rivers, including
rivers being studied for inclusion. 16 U.S.C. § 1278(a)-(b). See also supra note 9,
concerning water quality standards.
18. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 328 U.S. 152
(1946); see infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
19. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S.Ct. 2024 (1990)
(Rock Creek).
20. Walston, California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: New
Roadblock to State Water Rights Administration, 21 ENVTL. L. 89 (1990).
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the case for California, criticize the Court's decision. Walston
raises a number of practical difficulties the Court's opinion will

pose in regulating streamflows and suggests that Congress may be
motivated to respond by amending the FPA.21 I too think congressional action is warranted, but argue that despite California
v. FERC states are not powerless to maintain or increase streamflows from FERC-licensed projects.2 2 Nevertheless, because
FERC's track record reflects no institutional competence to make
difficult biological and economic tradeoffs inherent in setting
streamflow requirements, Walston is right to argue for a congressional reversal of California v. FERC.
I.

FEDERALISM UNDER THE

FPA

One would not suspect from a reading of the FPA that federal preemption of state laws is one of its distinguishing characteristics. Two provisions of the Act seem to indicate that Congress intended to save, not preempt, state law. Section 9(b)
requires license applicants to supply FERC with "satisfactory evidence" of compliance with state laws governing the use of beds
and banks of streams and "the appropriation, diversion, and use
of water for power purposes . . 23 Section 27 stipulates that
nothing in the FPA should be interpreted as affecting state laws
"relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of
water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any
vested right acquired therein."2 '
Further, the FPA's legislative history indicates that Congress
consciously sought to preserve state water laws.2" The author of
section 27 stated that he "took this language ... from section 8 of

the [Rieclamation law and inserted it in this bill."26 Section 8 of
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
sor bill
framed

See id. at 110-11.
See infra text accompanying notes 80-94 (§ V).
16 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2)(1988).
Id. § 821.
For example, the Senate Public Lands Committee Report on a predecesof the FPA, discussing a provision identical to § 27, concluded that "[iut is
upon the distinct theory that the State owns and controls the use of water

flowing within the streams within its boundaries .... The Federal Government

must contribute the use of land and the State government must contribute the use
of water ...." S. REP. No. 66, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1916). See also Walston,
supra note 20, at 98, 103-04 (citing legislative history).
26. 51 CONG. REC. 14,067 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Taylor). See also id. at
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the Reclamation Act requires the Bureau of Reclamation to acquire water rights under state law and also to comply with state
conditions unless those conditions "are inconsistent with congressional directives" pertaining to a particular reclamation project."
Moreover, for nearly a quarter century, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) interpreted the FPA as requiring licensees to comply with state laws.28 That interpretation, however, was one that
the New Deal Supreme Court did not share.
II. THE LONG

SHADOW OF FIRST IOWA

In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, perhaps
the best known (if much lamented) judicial interpretation of the
FPA, the Supreme Court in 1946 ruled that the Act did not require federal licensees to comply with state law.29 The case concerned a large public power project (a one-and-a-half mile wide
dam) impounding nearly the entire flow of the Cedar River in
Iowa and diverting it from its natural destination in the Iowa
River to the Mississippi River."0 First Iowa Cooperative sought an
FPC license for the project, but the State of Iowa objected on two
grounds: the project had not received a permit under a state dam
licensing law, and the project violated another state law prohibiting interbasin water transfers. 1 As a result, the FPC denied the
license, and the applicant appealed to the courts.3 2 The District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the license denial, 33 but the Supreme
14,070 (remarks of Rep. Raker) ("section 14' of this [Aict [a predecessor of § 27]
does what is done in the original reclamation act ....
).
27. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 679 (1978).
28. See, e.g., FEDERAL POWER COMM'N., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 27 (1921), H.R.
Doc. No. 242, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1921); FEDERAL POWER COMM'N, SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT 225 (1922), H.R. Doc. No. 473, 67th Cong., 3d Sess. 225 (1922)
("The applicant [for a license] must first show that he has obtained, pursuant to
the laws of the State, the right to appropriate, divert, and use the water for power
purposes.").
29. First Iowa Hydro-elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152
(1946). See generally Plouffe, Forty Years After First Iowa: A Call for Greater
Control of River Resources, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 833 (1986).
30. See First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 157-58.
31. See id. at 159, 161, 164-66.
32. Id. at 162.
33. First Iowa Hydro-elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 151 F.2d 20, 31
(D.C. Cir. 1945).
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Court reversed. 4 The Court held that section 9(b) of the FPA did
not require the FPC to deny the application for failure to comply
with the state dam licensing statute, for that would give the state
a veto over the federal licensing scheme, 5 contrary to congressional intent. 6 According to the Court, section 9(b) authorized,
but did not require the FPC. to demand of its applicants satisfactory evidence of compliance with state laws." Thus, First Iowa
did not interpret the FPA to categorically preempt state laws;
rather, it authorized selective preemption at the discretion of the
FPC. The First Iowa Court also ruled that the Iowa statute in
question was not protected by the language of section 27, which
saves state water laws.38 Justice Burton suggested that a dam licensing statute was not the kind of State law Congress intended
to preserve in section 27, a provision intended to have "primary,
if not exclusive reference to ... proprietary rights."39 Therefore,
the state of Iowa could not use section 27 to escape the preemptive effect of section 9(b).
There has never really been a satisfactory explanation for the
First Iowa Court's willingness to find preemption despite statutory text and legislative history apparently saving state laws. The
Iowa statute at issue seemed to the Court to threaten to veto a
large public power project for minimal state gain.4 Hydroelectric
34. First Iowa Hydro-elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152
(1946).
35. Id. at 167-68. "A dual final authority, with a duplicate system of state
permits and federal licenses required for each project would be unworkable." Id.
at 168.
36. Id. at 164 (state veto power could destroy the FPA).
37. "[Section 9(b)] enables [the FPC] to secure, in so far as it deems it material, such parts or all of the information that the respective States may have prescribed .. .as a basis for state action." Id. at 169 (emphasis in original).
38. See supra text accompanying note 24.
39. First Iowa Hydro-elec. Coop. v.'
Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. at 176.
The opinion elaborated:
The phrase 'any vested right acquired therein' further emphasizes the application of the section to property rights. There is nothing in the paragraph to suggest a broader scope unless it be the words 'other uses.' Those
words, however, are confined to'rights of the same nature as those relating
to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes.
Id.
40. See First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 164: "To require ... a state permit ... as a
condition precedent to securing a federal license ... would vest [the state with] a
veto over the federal project. Such a veto destroys the effectiveness of the Federal
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power was a central component of the New Deal economic program, especially public power that would supply a rate "yardstick" to measure private power rates and bring electricity to rural areas.4 ' Earlier, the New Deal Court sanctioned expansive
federal control over hydroelectric projects4 2 and helped reduce
the costs of federal projects through application of the navigation
servitude doctrine.' 3 Thus, the best explanation of First Iowa
may be an example of an activist Court's willingness to help promote the perceived federal interest in hydroelectric development.
III.

FIRST IOWA'S PROGENY

First Iowa might have been interpreted to apply only to state
dam licensing statutes that could veto federally approved
projects. But the FPC, seeking to expand its powers, pushed for a
broad construction of the FPA's preemptive effect. And the
courts, which approved a broad construction of the FPA's jurisdiction, also ratified the FPC's expansive interpretation of its preemptive powers.
The Supreme Court, for example, reaffirmed First Iowa in
ruling that a federal license could be issued despite noncompliAct." Id. at 164. The state's gain from the veto would have involved maintaining
streamflows in the Cedar and Iowa Rivers for a total of fifty-seven miles. The
District of Columbia Circuit viewed this as an important environmental issue:
"The maintenance of running streams, the preservation of wildlife, the rights of
riparian owners, long-established titles, drainage, sewage, and industrial waste disposal; these and many other problems of public health and public policy are involved." First Iowa Hydro-elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 151 F.2d 20, 29
(D.C. Cir. 1945). However, the Supreme Court dismissed the public health issues
by explaining that there were no towns on the Cedar River below the diversion
(the Court did not mention towns on the Iowa River), discounted the effects on
shoreside landowners because the project proponent secured options on 98% of
the riparian rights on the Cedar River, and ignored the fish and wildlife concerns
entirely. See First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 158.
41. See generally P. FUNIGIELLo, TOWARD A NATIONAL POWER POLICY: THE
NEW DEAL AND

THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY,

1932-41 (1973); Blumm, The

Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act' 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 191-202 (1983).
42. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (navigable
waters under the FPA include not just those navigable in fact but also those capable of becoming navigable by reasonable improvements).
43. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 344 U.S. 499 (1945) (upstream
owner of riparian lands had no Fifth Amendment right to compensation against
federal navigation project that reduced generating capacity of its power plant).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2964589

1991]

FUTURE OF MINIMUM STREAMFLOWS

ance with state fish protection 4 and eminent domain statutes.' 5
Other courts have preempted state water diversion 4 and land use
requirements.' 7 Yet after the Supreme Court's 1978 decision interpreting the provision in the Reclamation Act upon which section 27 was based"' to give states the right to condition reclamation project operations, 4 9 many thought that First Iowa had been
implicitly overruled, or at least limited.50 A recent decision by the
District of Columbia Circuit, holding that the FPA does not give
FERC the authority to preempt state tort law,5 gave further
hope to states' rights advocates. In 1990, these hopes were
dashed.
44. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1955) (permit
from state fish commission); Washington Dep't of Game v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1953) (written approval of project required
from state fisheries and game departments), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
45. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 341 (1958), rev'g
49 Wash. 2d 781, 307 P.2d 567 (1957). The state supreme court had held that the
licensee lacked authority to construct the project because it would inundate a
state-owned fish hatchery without permission to condemn state-owned lands.
46. Washington Dep't of Game, 207 F.2d at 395-96 (permit for water
diversion).
47. Town of Springfield.v. Vermont, 521 F. Supp. 243, 246 (D. Vt. 1981) (land
use permit for relocation of highway and development of recreational areas); see
also Town of Springfield v. McCarren, 549 F. Supp. 1134, 1154-57 (D. Vt. 1982)
(preempting a state licensing statute), afi'd, 722 F.2d 728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 942 (1983).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
49. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); see supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Arnold, Emerging Possibilities for State Control of Hydroelectric Development, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,135 (May 1983); Burke,
Small Scale Hydroelectric Development and Federal Environmental Law: A
Guide for the Private Developer, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 815 (1981); Thomas,
Leacox & Farman, Federal Incentives for Hydroelectric Power Projects At New
Dams: FERC's Failure to Recognize Congressional Intent and Environmental
Concerns, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 287 (1984); Wolfe, Hydropower: FERC Licensing
and Emerging State-Federal Water Rights Conflicts, 29 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
851 (1983); Comment, Hydroelectric Power, The Federal Power Act, and State
Water Laws: Is Federal Preemption Water Over the Dam?, 17 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
1179 (1984).
51. South Carolina Public Serv. Auth. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
850 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (FERC cannot condition a relicensing on the licensee's acceptance of strict liability in the event of an earthquake); see Note, Limitations on the Authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1188-95 (1989).
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V. FERC

The State of California challenged the continued viability of
First Iowa in a case involving the Rock Creek hydroelectric project, located on a tributary of the South Fork of the American
River. In 1983, FERC issued a license to the project that included
interim minimum flow requirements to protect trout. 52 FERC also
required post-licensing studies, in consultation with federal and
state fishery agencies, to acquire information to set permanent
flow rates for the project. In 1985, two years later, the licensee
submitted a report to FERC recommending permanent adoption
of the interim flows, but the California Department of Fish and
Game recommended significantly higher minimum flows. 3
The licensee also applied for a state water permit, which was
granted in 1984 and conformed to the interim flow rates in the
FERC license. However, the state attempted to reserve the right
to set different permanent flows, and in 1987-four years after
the license was issued-the state water board approved flow rates
higher than FERC's minimum flows. 4 FERC then issued an order
directing the licensee to comply with the lower flows in the license, concluding that setting minimum flows was an issue within
its exclusive jurisdiction and that allowing states to set minimum
flow rates would give them a veto power over projects inconsistent
with First Iowa.s5 FERC did, however, order a hearing on the flow
issue, and a FERC administrative law judge set slightly higher
flows than were originally in the license. 6 After being denied administrative relief,5 7 California appealed to the courts. On the ba-

sis of First Iowa, the Ninth Circuit affirmed FERC, 58 and so did

52. Joseph M. Keating, 23 F.E.R.C. 62,137, at 63,201 (Apr. 29, 1983).
53. Rock Creek Ltd., 38 F.E.R.C. 61,240, at 61,772 (Mar. 11, 1987).
54. The state's minimum flows were 60 cubic feet per second (cfs) March-

June, and 30 cfs for the remainder of the year. FERC originally set flows at 11 cfs
May-September, and 15 cfs throughout the rest of the year. Subsequently, FERC
amended the flows to 20 cfs for the entire year. See California v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2024, 2027-28 (1990).
55. Rock Creek Ltd., 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,772-74.
56. The administrative law judge's initial decision appears at 41 F.E.R.C.
63,019 (Nov. 16,'1987). See supra note 54 for discussion of the flow rates.
57. Rock Creek Ltd., 41 F.E.R.C. 61,198 (Nov. 20, 1987) (order denying the
state's motibn for a rehearing).
58. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 877 F.2d 743 (9th Cir.
1989).
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the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion that may prompt
Congress to reconsider the appropriate state role in hydropower

licensing.59

,

Justice O'Connor's opinion represented a thoroughgoing victory for FERC and its licensees, and a significant loss for the
states and those concerned about preserving streamflows for
nonpower uses. The Court did admit that California's argument
that section 27 preserves state water laws would present "a close
question" as to whether the state could set minimum flows for the
Rock Creek project if this were a case of the first impression."
But the Court ruled that the four-decade-old First Iowa decision
governed the Rock Creek result. Section 27 saved only state laws
allocating "proprietary" rights, and California 6admitted that its
action did not establish any proprietary rights. '
Even though the California minimum flows were factually
distinct from the Iowa dam licensing statute,6- the Court gave a
number of reasons for adhering to the First Iowa precedent. First,
the Court was unwilling to depart from such a "long-standing and
well entrenched decision[]," especially one interpreting "a-complex regulatory regime[]," because the Court convinced itself that,
for over four decades, Congress acquiesced in and FERC licensees
obtained a reliance interest in the First Iowa result.6

Moreover,

59. California v. Federal: Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990)
(Rock Creek).

60. Id. at 2028.
61. Id. at 2028-29. Cf. supra note 51 and accompanying text (FPA does not
preempt .state tort law).
62. The state minimum flows were a condition on project operations,
not-like the state dam licensing statute in First Iowa-a judgment on the suitability of the project itself. Thus, they appear to be similar to the state environmental regulations on mining operations on federal lands, which the Court recently sustained in California Coastal Comm'n. v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572
(1987). Nevertheless, the Court considered the minimum flows to exercise a veto
over the project. See California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S.Ct.
at 2034. Yet, the Court failed to distinguish these impermissible state flow levels
from the permissible state mining regulations in Granite Rock.
63. There are actually two types of congressional acquiescence to the First
Iowa result evident in the California v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Comm'n opinion. First, the Court cited the "deference this Court must accord to longstanding
and well-entrenched decisions . . .." California v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 110 S.Ct. 2024, 2029 (1990). Acquiescence through congressional inaction
has been a cardinal tenet of public land law. See, e:g., United States v. Midwest
Oil, 236 U.S. 459 (1915); Portland General Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 859
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Justice O'Connor opined that because the case involved issues of
statutory construction, it was more important for the Court to be
consistent than right about congressional intent."
The Court's second reason concerned its rejection of California's characterization of First Iowa as a section 9(b) case; according to Justice O'Connor, the First Iowa Court relied heavily on
section 27,16 even though the 1946 Court devoted only two pages
of its opinion to that provision." Third, the Court refused to
agree that the contrary result in its interpretation of the Reclamation Act should influence its interpretation of the FPA, although it did acknowledge "some tension" between the two
cases. "' The Court relied on some minor differences in the language of the two provisions and its conclusion that "the FPA envisioned a considerably broader and more active federal oversight
role in hydropower development than did the Reclamation Act.""
Finally, the Court dismissed legislative history indicating that
(D. Wyo. 1977). Second, the Court relied on Congress's enactment of the Electric
Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 43, which
amended the FPA without changing either § 9(b) or § 27, for the proposition that
Congress meant to implicitly affirm First Iowa. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2030. The two types of acquiescence are discussed
thoroughly in Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 67, 7184 (1988).
The notion that FERC licensees gained a reliance interest in the First Iowa
rule (see 110 S. Ct. at 2030) seems implausible. If an applicant for a license had a
vested interest in the status quo of a regulatory regime, Congress could not amend
statutes, and the Court could not hand down decisions like California Coastal
Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987), which allowed states to set
environmental conditions for mining activities on federal lands. See supra note 62.
64. "[Flor statutory determinations, 'it is more important that the applicable
rule be settled than that it be settled right ....
" California v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2030 (quoting Justice Brandeis). Professor Eskridge's study of legislative inaction concluded that legislative inaction was a poor
indicator of congressional intent. See Eskridge, supra note 63, at 90-108, 114-24
(arguing against even a presumption of correctness from legislative inaction).
65. "Only the [First Iowa] Court's narrow reading of § 27 allowed it to sustain [its preemptive] interpretation of § 9(b)." California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (1990).
66. See First Iowa Hydro-elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152,
177-79 (1945).
67. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2032.
68. Id. For able criticism of the Court's unconvincing attempt to distinguish
its 1978 California v. United States decision, see Walston, supra note 20, at 99,
especially n.32.
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section 27 of the FPA was patterned after section 8 of the Reclamation Act, stating that "[i]f a quite natural reading of the statutory language fails to displace an intervening [court] decision providing a contrary interpretation, legislative history
provides
little additional reason to overturn the [earlier] decision.""
The result in California v. FERC clearly preempted the
state's attempt to set minimum flows higher than those ordered
by FERC. But the Court was not so clear as to the reasoning for
and. thus the scope of the preemption. As the accompanying Essay by Roderick Walston points out, the Court might be interpreted to suggest that FERC authority under the FPA occupies
the field of hydroelectric regulation, thus preempting all state
regulation.70

However, Walston's

conclusion that the Court

adopted the narrower ground of preempting state laws that actually conflict with federal regulation seems much closer to the
mark. 7' The Court mentioned conflicting state requirements sev-

eral times.7 1 Moreover, the conflict approach is consistent with
the reasoning of First Iowa. 73 Walston uses the conflict theory of
preemption to suggest that while FERC may preempt state
streamflow requirements, it must nevertheless insist that its licensees comply with state water law in acquiring water rights.74 He
therefore suggests that California v. FERC does nothing to disturb the five-hundred-odd state permits California has issued to
hydroelectric projects and that, consequently, "the states still
75
may play an important role in hydropower development.

Although I am sympathetic with his objective, I disagree with
his conclusion. Given the Court's concern over not allowing the
states to veto FERC licenses,7 6 a state that denies a water right to
a project is very likely to find its authority preempted if FERC
decides to license the project without the state right. This is particularly true in the Ninth Circuit (where both Walston and I re69. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2033. On
the legislative history, see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
70. See Walston, supra note 20, at 108.
71. Id. at 109-10.
72. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2023, 2031,
2033-34 (1990). See Walston, supra note 20, at text accompanying note 69.
73. See supra text accompanying and following note 37.
74. Walston, supra note 20, ai 109.
75. Id.
76. See California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2034.
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side) because there is already precedent for FERC's preemption
of state water diversion requirements." I agree that the five hundred existing state water rights are not voided by California v.
FERC, 'but it seems to me that the decision does authorize FERC
to disregard state water law if it determines that conflicts with
FERC's licensing authority under the FPA. Thus, while the FPA
does not occupy the field and void all state water laws, it does
enable FERC to selectively preempt state requirements that it
deems inconsistent with a particular licensing decision. California
v. FERC, in other words, interprets the FPA to delegate preemptive authority to FERC on a case-by-case basis. The only exception is section 27's saving of state laws under which existing. "proprietary" rights Were created.78 This exception does not equip
states with a veto over projects, but it will require compensation
if vested proprietary rights are taken 79 Since states have the authority to define the nature of proprietary rights, 0 nothing in the
FPA would preclude a state from establishing minimum s treamflows as proprietary rights. Thus, the "proprietary rights" exception may enable states like Oregon to demand compensation from
FERC licensees if their minimum flows are disturbed.8"
V.

STATE FISH

FLOWS

AFTER CALIFORNIA V.

FERC

California v. FERC is likely to encourage FERC to interpret
its authority expansively, 2 and the decision has already
77. Washington Dep't of Game v. Federal Power Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391, 39596 (9th Cir. 1953).
78. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S.Ct. 2024, 2029,
2031-32, 2033 (1990). See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
80. See e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S.Ct. 791, 794-95, 798 (1988) (relying on state law to
fix the scope of the public trust doctrine which limits private property rights in
submerged lands).
81. Oregon statutes define an "in-stream water right" as "a water right held
in trust . . for the benefit of the people of the State of Oregon to maintain water
in-stream for public use" and stipulate that "the in-stream water right shall have
the same legal status as any other water right .... OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.332(2),
537.350 (1990).
82. Particularly troublesome may be the Court's dictum that the FPA gave
FERC the authority to set minimum streamflows "after considering which requirements would best protect wildlife and ensure that the project would be eco-
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prompted congressional activity aimed at reversing, its result.83

States rights and fish ,and wildlife advocates will no doubt support such initiatives, but amendments to the FPA should not give
states an absolute veto over licenses. For one thing, relicenses
under the Federal Power Act are functionally the equivalent of
initial licenses. 4 Thus, state veto authority could be used to shut
down existing projects which serve out-of-state markets, a result
Congress would not likely intend. Moreover, an absolute veto
would not necessarily ensure greater downstream fish and wildlife
protection. For example, if fish protection required out-of-state
downstream flows, the upstream state might want to hold water
in the project reservoir to encourage consumptive uses. Consequently, a "states' rights" amendment to the FPA should authorize the application of state laws to FERC licenses only where
state requirements would not produce unconstitutional burdens
on interstate commerce. s5 This would enable both FERC and reviewing agencies to ensure that states do not use their authorities
to discriminate against downstream, out-of-state resources or
uses. 6
nomically feasible, and thus further power development." California v. Federal
Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2033-34. Similarly, the Court seemed to accept
FERC's contention that state minimum flows would interfere with its comprehensive planning authority, id. at 2034, even though FERC prepares no comprehensive plans. See generally Cole, Reviving the Federal Power Act's Comprehensive
Plan Requirement: A History of Neglect and Prospectsfor the Future, 16 ENVTL.
L. 639 (1986).
83. See H.R. 4921, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (which would have amended

section 27 of the FPA to disclaim any intent to affect state water laws, "whether
or not regarding proprietary rights," and direct FERC to proceed in conformity
with state water laws).
84. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466, 470-71 (9th Cir. 1984) (interpreting § 15(a) of the
FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)).
85. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (striking down a
New Jersey law banning the import of out-of-state wastes in order to preserve
space in New Jersey landfills); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (striking
down an Oklahoma law barring export of Oklahoma minnows); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (striking down a Nebraska law -barring export of
groundwater to states that did not allow exports to Nebraska). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-8, 6-10, at 422-26, 427-29 (2d ed.
1988).
86. Absent such a provision, courts might interpret a provision allowing a

state to veto a FERC license to constitute congressional ratification of what would
otherwise be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. See Prudential
Ins.. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (federal statute limiting the applicability
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Even in the absence of an amendment to the FPA, states are
not powerless to secure flows from FERC-licensed projects. States
may insist on flows necessary to meet water quality requirements.87 They also may condition projects qualifying for exemptions from licensing on maintaining minimum flows.88 They may
submit recommended flows to FERC under section 10(j) of the
FPA, and, based on these recommendations, FERC must include
in its licenses conditions that will "adequately and equitably protect, mitigate damages to, and enhance" fish, wildlife, and
habitat.8 9 Finally, states may influence federal land management
agencies or federal fish and wildlife agencies to prescribe protective conditions where projects are on federal reservations" or require fishways, 9" respectively.
In addition, California v. FERC may be interpreted narrowly.
The case involved the state's role in post-licensing decision making, where the applicant had already been operating the project.
Prior to licensing, states may have greater authority, and certainly greater leverage. Section 10(j) requires some FERC deference to states in formulating license conditions to protect fish and
wildlife.2 Although the Supreme Court gave FERC authority to
of antitrust laws to the insurance industry held to have ratified a discriminatory
South Carolina tax on out-of-state insurance companies). See generally Cohen,
Congressional Power To Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A ForgottenSolution To An Old Dilemma, 35 STAN, L. REv. 387 (1983).

87. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). This provision gives states the right to condition
(and veto) federally-licensed projects through a water quality certification process,
which may include "any other appropriate requirement of state law set forth in
such certification ... ." Id. § 1341(d).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 823a (1988); see Blumm & Kloos, supra note 12, at 598.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 803(j); see infra note 92.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e); see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
91. Id. § 811; see supra note 17. However, FERC seems to be interpreting this
§ 18 authority to apply only to fish screens and bypass mechanisms, not to operating conditions. See Lynchburg Hydro Assoc., 39 F.E.R.C. 61,079 (Apr. 29, 1987);
Clearwater Hydro, Ltd., 41 F.E.R.C.
61,330 (Dec. 16, 1987); Eugene Water &
Elec. Bd., 49 F.E.R.C. 61,211 (Nov. 16, 1989).
92. 16 U.S.C. § 803(j) requires (1) license conditions protecting fish and wildlife to be based on federal and state fish and wildlife agency recommendations
(see supra text accompanying note 73); (2) FERC to give "due weight" to these
recommendations; and (3) if it does not adopt the recommended measures to explain why they would be inconsistent with the FPA and whether the license conditions chosen will "adequately and equitably" protect fish and wildlife. On the
meaning of adequate and equitable, see Grimm, Fishery Protection and FERC
Hydropower Relicensing Under ECPA: Maintaining a Deadly Status Quo, 20
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reject post-licensing recommendations, it may be that FERC cannot comply with section 10(j) by delaying consideration of state
9 3
recommended conditions until after licensing.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor repeatedly emphasized that Cal9
ifornia's fish flow conditions established no proprietary rights. '
Where state conditions are designed to protect preexisting proprietary rights, they may not be preempted by the FPA. States like
Oregon consider minimum flows to be proprietary rights, 95 so California v. FERC should not govern the result where a project
would interfere with vested, proprietary minimum flows. However, because the FPA authorizes FERC licensees to condemn
water rights, 6 it may be that the effect of interfering with an Oregon-like streamflow is to enable the state to receive just compensation for the taking, rather than block an unwanted project.
Apart from the difficulties of valuing the lost public property
right, states may find monetary payments from licensees an inadequate surrogate for regulatory authority. In short, the "proprietary exception" to FERC preemptive authority under California
v. FERC is not likely to make states less interested in amending
the statute.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A recent article suggests that the result of California v.
FERC may be greater environmental protection by virtue of
FERC's preemption of state water laws.9 It is true that FERC
has occasionally required its licensees to maintain streamflows
over state objections,9" and it might do so in the future. So perhaps FERC will employ the authority conferred upon it by the
929 (1990).
93. This seems to be the implication of Confederated Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.
1984); see supra note 11 and accompanying text. In retrospect, California should
have registered its objections and pursued its appeals at the time the license was
4
issued, instead of deferring until completion of post-licensing studies.
94. See California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2024,
2029, 2030-31 (1990).
95. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
96. 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1988).
97. Kirsch & Seitz, Environmental Protection Through Preemption of State
Water Laws, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,438 (1990).
98. See, e.g., Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,079 (Jan. 28,
1988).
ENVTL. L.
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Supreme Court to reach fair balances between competing economic and environmental values in setting streamflow conditions.
But to paraphrase what Judge Belloni once wrote in another context, such a prediction requires a disregard of everything we know
about FERC and streamflows serving environmental purposes. 9
A number of recent studies confirm FERC's consistent willingness
to favor maximizing hydroelectric revenues at the expense of fish
and wildlife protection."'0
Only four. years ago, in response to widespread complaints
about FERC's insensitivity to fish and wildlife protection, ' Congress amended the FPA to give greater protection to fish and
wildlife. Unfortunately, the principal result-the consultation
process required by section 10(j) of the FPA 02-has failed to produce a balanced approach to streamflow protection versus hydropower revenue tradeoffs.1 0 3 California v. FERC will exacerbate
that failure by increasing FERC's authority over the states. Congress ought to reward Justice O'Connor's faith in its ability to
correct the Court's mistakes'" by reversing California v. FERC
and. amending the FPA to finally achieve the seventy-year-old
congressional objective of giving states the same role in setting
streamflows at nonfederal hydroelectric projects as they possess
at federal reclamation projects.' 05
99. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 905 (D. Or. 1969).
100. See, e.g., J. ECHEVERRIA, P. BARRON & R. Roos COLLINS, supra note 10;
Bodi & Erdheim, supra note 8; Feldman, supra note 13; Grimm, supra note 90.
101. See HR. REP. No. 507, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2496, 2505.
102. 16 U.S.C. § 803(j)(1988), discussed supra note 92.
103. See generally Grimm, supra note 92.
104. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2024, 2030
(1990); see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
105. On the original intent of the drafters of the FPA, see supra notes 25-26
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the anomalies created by California v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n on streams with both reclamation and
FERC-licensed projects, see Walston, supra note 20, at 104-07.
It is possible to interpret United States v. California, 438 U.S. 695 (1978), see
notes 27 and 49 and accompanying text, and California v. Federal Regulatory
Comm'n as establishing a consistent principle-that states may not require dam
operators to act inconsistently with federal project purposes. But reclamation project purposes are established by Congress; nonfederal hydroelectric project purposes are basically established by FERC in ad hoc licensing proceedings. Moreover, the key determination, the economic feasibility of the project at various
streamflow levels, is heavily influenced by financing and marketing factors that
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can be easily manipulated by applicants and are often quite subjective. That such
factors can serve to displace state laws under the rubric of federal preemption not
only illustrates the irrationality of California v. Federal Regulatory Comm'n, but
also indicates how, although the FPA calls for balanced and multiple use of
streamflows, the FERC licensing process can produce results that are heavily biased toward applicant visions of economic viability at the expense of fish and
wildlife protection. See e.g., Eugence water and Elec. Bd., 49 F.E.R.C. T 61, 211 at
61, 739-43 (Nov.16, 1989) (FERC rejection of temperature control devices recommended by fishery agencies on economic cost grounds).
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